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Abstract: This paper studies the effects of two different frames on decisions in a dictator game.
Before making their allocation decision, dictators read a short text. Depending on the treatment,
the text either emphasizes their decision power and freedom of choice or it stresses their responsibility
for the receiver’s payoff. Including a control treatment without such a text, three treatments
are conducted with a total of 207 dictators. Our results show a different reaction to these texts
depending on the dictator’s gender. We find that only men react positively to a text that stresses their
responsibility for the receiver, while only women seem to react positively to a text that emphasizes
their decision power and freedom of choice.
Keywords: dictator game; framing; gender; experiment
JEL Classification: C91; D63; D64; D91
1. Introduction
The dictator game [1,2] has been used extensively in experimental economics and related fields
in order to study social preferences such as fairness and altruism. In the basic game, a dictator has
an endowment that she can allocate between herself and a receiver. While most results suggest that
dictators do not always behave selfishly (see Engel [3] for a review and meta-analysis), it has been
argued that the dictator game is rather sensitive to the context and the frame in which the game is
presented [4–8].
In this paper, we study the effect of two different context frames [9] on dictators’ decisions,
specifically the effect of two different texts, which participants read before making their decision.
In one treatment, this text affirms the dictators’ freedom of decision and decision power1 while in the
other treatment the text reminds dictators of their responsibility for the other player.2 Both texts have
in common that they refer to the dictator’s power, but they differ in the implied recommended use of
this power: while the first one explicitly refrains from implying either a selfish or an altruistic decision
and instead emphasizes using the power at one’s discretion, the second one highlights that power
comes with responsibility for others, which may increase giving to the recipient.
Reminding people that they are responsible for the other person (treatment Responsibility), but
also that they are the sole decision maker (treatment DecisionPower) may make people perceive stronger
1 The exact wording was: “You alone decide about the payoffs, and you are completely free in your decision”,
2 The exact wording was: “You bear the responsibility for both payoffs, your own and the one of participant B”.
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accountability for their own decision. Brañas-Garza et al. [10] show that feelings of accountability for
the decision (or responsibility as it is called in their paper), which the authors define as having control
over the decision, affect dictator’s altruism. Following this definition, the treatment Responsibility
may directly increase feelings of accountability while the treatment DecisionPower may indirectly
increase feelings of accountability by reminding dictators that they are in control over the allocation
decision. If people feel more accountable for their (selfish) action, it will be more difficult to maintain
a positive self-image when acting in a selfish way. Thus, people may respond to both treatment
conditions by giving more to the receiver [11,12].3 Additionally, increasing the salience of being
responsible for someone else (treatment Responsibility) makes it more likely that a dictator thinks about
the consequences for the other person when making her decision. Besides increasing accountability,
this may increase feelings of shame if a dictator would give little or nothing to the recipient. Feelings of
shame have been shown to increase altruistic behavior [11,14–16].
We are especially interested in whether these texts trigger different reactions by female and male
dictators. From previous research, we know that females tend to react stronger than males to the context
of an experiment in general [17–20]. Furthermore, psychological research has shown that women are
expected to be more caring, altruistic and other-oriented [21–24]. In a dictator game, women [25] or
men and women likewise [26] believe that female dictators are more generous. Higher expectations
to behave altruistically lead to higher social pressure to act accordingly [22,23,27]. Hence, women
may feel a higher pressure to help a person in need. This form of social pressure to act altruistically is,
therefore, mainly exerted by society but also by participants themselves if they want to maintain their
self-image of being someone who follows social norms or fulfills expectations. We believe that the
two frames in this experiment affect the social pressure to give differently. While the text highlighting
dictator’s freedom of choice attempts to decrease the pressure (“...you are completely free in your
decision.”), the text emphasizing dictator’s responsibility for the recipient may increase social pressure
(“You bear the responsibility for both payoffs, ...”). Since women and men may initially feel a different
level of social pressure, these texts could potentially trigger a different reaction depending on whether
a male or female dictator reads them. Thus, we expect that both genders may respond differently to
our treatment conditions.
In order to study this research question, we conduct a pen and paper dictator game experiment,
comprising three treatments in a between-subject design. In two of the three treatments, either the
text emphasizing the dictator’s responsibility or the text highlighting the dictator’s decision power is
printed on top of the decision sheet. The third treatment serves as a control treatment without a text.
In total, 207 participants in the role of the dictator participated in the experiment.
We find that highlighting the dictator’s responsibility for the payoffs of both players has a positive
effect on the amount given. This effect is driven by the behavior of men, who react strongly positive,
whereas women show no response to this text. Emphasizing the dictator’s decision power and freedom
of choice has no significant effect; if at all, it tends to increase giving by female dictators.
2. Related Literature
Closest to our study is the one by Brañas-Garza [28], in which the text “Note that your recipient
relies on you” is added to the bottom of the instructions of a dictator game. The author finds that
adding this text increases dictators’ giving significantly. This text is similar to our first text about
the responsibility of the dictator. Besides replicating their findings in this respect, our paper adds
the DecisionPower frame and a focus on gender differences with respect to the two different frames
explained above. A recent study by Capraro et al. [29] asks dictators what they think would be the
right thing to do or what they think society would consider the right thing to do before making
their decision. They find that such a question increases dictator’s giving significantly. Remotely related
3 See the theory of self-concept maintenance by Mazar et al. [13].
Games 2018, 9, 28 3 of 16
are two studies by Haley and Fessler [30] and Rigdon et al. [31], which also manipulate the decision
environment in a dictator game by adding figures of “watching eyes” on the decision screen of the
dictator and which also find that these manipulations increase dictators’ giving. Furthermore, it has
been shown that communication between the dictator and the receiver affects giving positively and
that the content of the communication matters [32–35]. Dal Bó and Dal Bó [36] use a similar approach
to ours in a different context, i.e., a repeated public good game. After a first sequence of rounds, they
show participants one of five different messages. They find that moral appeals increase contributions
significantly but transitory.4
Another study closely related to the present one is Bruttel et al. [33], in which the effect of free-form
text messages written by the receiver and read by the dictator prior to a binary dictator decision is
analyzed. These text messages are categorized into eight categories, one of which contains statements
that “the dictator has the sole decision power and / or the sole responsibility for both payments.”
Such messages increase dictators’ willingness to share if the dictator is a women. However, this study
cannot separate the effects of messages referring to the dictator’s responsibility from those mentioning
the dictator’s decision power. Furthermore, the present paper analyzes the effect of the two different
statements in a more controlled setting by not using free-form messages of the recipient but different
texts written by the experimenters.
Regarding the context-dependence of dictator giving, it has been shown, for example,
that dictators’ giving decreases if anonymity of decisions is increased [37–40]5, that the social
distance between dictator and receiver affects dictators’ decision [38,42–45], that giving increases
if the receiver is perceived as more deserving of help [46,47], that giving decreases if the endowment
is earned instead of given by the experimenter [6,37,39], that giving decreases if the dictator has the
additional option of taking money from the receiver [6,48], that giving decreases if the dictator can
disguise her decision [11] and that giving increases if the receiver is referred to as a partner and that
the joint endowment should be allocated between oneself and the partner [49]. There are mixed
results regarding the question whether framing dictator’s decision as taking something from the
receiver in contrast to the normally used frame of giving something to the receiver has an effect on
dictator’s decision. While Dreber et al. [50], Suvoy [51] and Grossman and Eckel [52] find no effect,
Cox et al. [53] and Korenok et al. [54] as well as Korenok et al. [55], who additionally let the respective
party earn the endowment, find that receivers’ earnings are higher if dictators have to take funds
from them.
Finally, a meta-analysis on gender differences in dictator games has shown that women give
significantly more to receivers than men [3]. However, this result seems to depend heavily on the
specific design and context of the experiment [17]. For example, Andreoni and Vesterlund [56] find
that women are more concerned with equality of payoffs, whereas men are more concerned with
maximizing the sum of payoffs. Furthermore, female dictators are found to be more sensitive to
receivers’ gender, i.e., women give less to women than to men [57]. In a review of gender differences
in the experimental economics literature, Croson and Gneezy [17] state that they believe women react
stronger to the social conditions of an experiment on social preferences such as the dictator game.
3. Experimental Design and Procedures
In the experiment, participants play either the role of a dictator (named participant A) or the one
of a receiver (participant B). Each dictator has an endowment of 30 Euros6 and can decide how much of
4 These messages either reminded participants “that moral actions are those that treat others as you would like to be treated”
or “that actions are moral to the extent that they contribute to maximizing collective payoffs”.
5 However, also paying the dictator in public can lead to lower generosity [41].
6 30 Euros ≈ 35 Dollars at the time of the experiment.
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this endowment she wants to give to the receiver.7 Every integer between 0 and 30 is a valid decision.
This dictator game is played only once (one-shot).
The experiment consists of three different treatments in a between-subject design. In two of these
treatments (Responsibility and DecisionPower), a specific text is shown to the dictators before they make
their decision while the third treatment serves as a control treatment without such a text (Control).
The text in the treatment Responsibility emphasizes the dictator’s responsibility for the payoff of the
receiver by saying “You bear the responsibility for both payoffs, your own and the one of participant
B.”8 The text in the treatment DecisionPower emphasizes the dictator’s decision power and freedom of
choice by saying “You alone decide about the payoffs, and you are completely free in your decision.”9
At all other instances, the instructions were neutrally formulated and carefully avoided mentioning
the hierarchical relationship between the dictator and the recipient.
The experiment was conducted in December 2017 in two lecture rooms at the University of
Potsdam using pen and paper. In one of these rooms, 207 students arrived and were all assigned the
role of the dictator.10 The receivers, who were also students, were in another lecture room at the same
time. The dictators were informed about this in the instructions.11
The experiment took place before a first-year bachelor course in microeconomics. Participants for
the role of the dictators were recruited via mailing invitations to students of this course as well as an
announcement in this course one week prior to the experiment. Participants in the role of recipients
were invited to participate immediately before the start of their lecture at the day of the experiment.
They were told that they would obtain the money other participants gave them and that the money
would be paid out to them immediately after the end of that lecture. No one in that room refused
to participate.
Of the 207 dictators, 105 (51%) were women and 101 (49%) were men. One dictator did not
provide information on their gender. On average, participants were around 21 years old. The most
frequent field of study was business administration (35% of the dictators), followed by economics
(31%) and political sciences and economics (28%).
Before entering the room for the experiment, dictators received a randomly drawn card on which
they found their assigned seat and their ID number. At their seat, participants found a large envelope
with a sticker on it, which repeated the information from their card. Hence, they were randomly
assigned to one of the three treatments. 56 dictators participated in the treatment Control, 77 in the
treatment Responsibility and 74 in the treatment DecisionPower. Table A1 in the Appendix A provides
information about the distribution of participants’ characteristics (gender and age) across treatments.
The envelope at the participants’ seats contained general and specific instructions, one small envelope
marked with the number 1, which contained the decision sheet, and one small envelope marked
with the number 2, which contained the questionnaire.12 Figure 1 shows the decision sheets for all
three treatments. The additional texts on the decision sheets in the treatments Responsibility and
DecisionPower are marked by a red dotted rectangle.
7 Only 10% of the participants were paid after the experiment took place as is explained in detail in the end of this Section.
The instructions, however, stress that dictators should think carefully about their decision as it has real consequences if they
are drawn for payment. Paying only a fraction of participants is not uncommon in experimental economics, especially in
classroom settings [58] or in survey experiments [59].
8 The original text in German was: “Sie tragen die Verantwortung für beide Auszahlungen, Ihre eigene und die von
Teilnehmer/-in B”.
9 The original text in German was: “Sie allein entscheiden über die Auszahlungen, und Sie sind völlig frei in
Ihrer Entscheidung”.
10 Prior to the experiment, we did a power calculation in which we estimated effect sizes by using the results
from Brañas-Garza [28]. We concluded that we would need around 25 observations for each gender for each treatment to
find significant effects. Thus, we intended to conduct the experiment with a minimum number of 150 dictators.
11 While it may potentially affect dictators’ decisions that receivers are not in the same room, we do not see a reason why such
an effect should differ between the treatments.
12 Pictures of the material used for the experiment can be found in the Appendix C.
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(a) Control (b) Responsibility (c) DecisionPower
Figure 1. Decision sheets depending on the treatment (in the original, German language).
In the beginning of the experiment, a short introduction was read aloud to all participants by
the experimenter, who was not the lecturer of the microeconomics course. Then, participants read
the general and specific instructions by themselves.13 Afterwards, they opened the first envelope,
made their decision and closed the envelope again. Next, they opened the second envelope, completed
the questionnaire and closed the envelope again. Finally, they put everything back in the large envelope
and sealed it. Subsequently, the envelopes were collected.
Participants were informed in verbal and written form that only 1 in 10 participants would be
randomly selected for payment after all envelopes were collected. This was done by letting one of
the participants publicly roll a 10-sided die. Each participant whose last digit of their ID number was
the number diced was randomly matched with one receiver in the second room and received their
payment subsequently. The participants in the second room randomly drew a card with a number
on it to determine whether they would receive a payment. Each dictator chosen by the roll of the
die was matched randomly to one of those receivers. Receivers who were not matched to one of the
dictators did not receive a payment.14 In total, 21 dictators were randomly matched to 21 receivers.
Thus, 42 participants received a payment after the experiment.
4. Results
Participants in the role of a dictator on average give 40.2% of their endowment of 30 Euros to
the receiver, i.e., 12.05 Euros. Dictators in the treatment Control give 36.8%, dictators in the treatment
Responsibility give 43.0% and dictators in the treatment DecisionPower give 39.7% of their endowment.
Averaged over all treatments, women are slightly more generous by giving 41.4 % compared to
men giving 38.7% of their endowment. This difference, however, is not statistically significant
(Wilcoxon Rank Sum test: z = 0.210, p = 0.8340).
Figure 2 shows average dictators’ decisions as a share of endowment separated by treatment and
gender. On average, men give 33.5% in the Control treatment, 45.9% in the Responsibility treatment and
33.8% of their endowment in the DecisionPower treatment. Female dictators seem to react completely
different than men to the two frames. On average, they give 38.9% in the Control treatment, 39.5% in
the Responsibility treatment and 45.4% of their endowment in the DecisionPower treatment.
13 An English translation of the originally German verbal instructions, general instructions and specific instructions can be
found in the Appendix B.
14 There were fewer participants in the second room than in the first room. Participants in the role of the dictator who sat in
the first room received no information about the number of participants present in the second room.
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Figure 2. Mean giving separated by treatment and gender. Note: The figure shows means as well as
95% confidence intervals.
Since participants’ characteristics are not perfectly balanced between treatments (see Table A1 in
the Appendix A),15 we use OLS (ordinary least squares) regressions to test for treatment and gender
differences.16 Table 1 presents the regression results. The first column uses the full sample, the second
and third column present the results for male and female participants separately.17
The regression results for the full sample in column (1) show that the text emphasizing the
dictator’s responsibility has a positive and statistically significant effect on dictators’ giving compared
to the Control treatment. Adding a text that highlights the dictator’s freedom of choice and decision
power is also estimated to increase giving. However, this effect is not statistically significant (p = 0.336).
In line with the descriptive analysis in Figure 2, columns (2) and (3) in Table 1 show that the
positive effect of the Responsibility treatment on giving is entirely driven by male dictators (p = 0.015).
For female dictators, the effect of the Responsibility treatment is close to zero (p = 0.955). On the
contrary, the effect of the DecisionPower treatment is estimated to be close to zero for men (p = 0.946),
while the results suggest a positive effect for women, which is significant at the 10% level (p = 0.068).
15 For example, there are more men in the treatment Responsibility than in the treatment Control, who, on average, give slightly
less than women. Hence, simply comparing the means may understate a potential effect.
16 A Tobit model may be more appropriate for the analysis of the dictators’ decision if left-censoring in the dependent variable
is a concern. (See [60] or [3] for good discussions of the appropriateness of different models to analyze dictator game
decisions.) However, only 7% of the dictators decided to give 0 Euro in our study, which is a very low fraction compared to
other studies (A meta-analysis found 36% of dictators to give nothing to the recipient [3], while in a survey-experiment,
which also paid only 1 in 10 participants, around 17% of dictators decided to give 0 Euro [59]). Therefore, we do not believe
that censoring from below is an issue here and decided to use an OLS model due to the slightly easier interpretation of
coefficients. Nevertheless, all of the results in Tables 1 and A2 are robust to using a Tobit model.
17 Table A2 in the Appendix A additionally shows the results of an OLS regression including interaction effects of gender with
the treatment variables.
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Table 1. The ordinary least squares (OLS) regression results.
Variables (1) Full Sample (2) Men (3) Women
Responsibility 0.063 ** 0.125 ** −0.002(0.031) (0.050) (0.037)
DecisionPower 0.030 −0.003 0.068 *(0.031) (0.052) (0.037)
male −0.028(0.025)
age −0.003 −0.003 −0.001(0.004) (0.008) (0.005)
Constant 0.429 *** 0.418 ** 0.402 ***(0.099) (0.189) (0.106)
Observations 205 100 105
R-squared 0.100 0.171 0.136
Note: The dependent variable in all regressions is the share of the endowment given by the dictator.
The regression depicted in column (2) only includes observations by male dictators, the one in column
(3) only observations by female dictators. All regressions additionally control for participants’ field of study.
*** significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%; * significant at 10%.
5. Discussion and Conclusion
In this study, we analyzed the effects of two different short texts, which were printed on the
decision sheet, on giving in a dictator game. The Responsibility treatment reminded dictators of their
responsibility for the recipient’s payoff, the DecisionPower treatment highlighted the dictator’s freedom
of decision. Furthermore, we analyzed differences in behavior depending on dictator’s gender.
We expected the Responsibility treatment to increase giving (because of the increased salience
of responsibility), and more so for females than for males (because women are presumably under
stronger social pressure to behave pro-socially [21–24,27]). In our data, however, the Responsibility
treatment increases giving by male dictators only. One possible explanation for the lack of an effect
when reminding women that they are responsible for the payoff (and, thus, for the well-being) of the
receiver is that this text does not provide them with new information; they already feel responsible for
the receiver due to the general expectation that females care for others who depend on them [21–24].
Hence, our treatment text would not increase the feelings of responsibility and the pressure to behave
altruistically anymore. For men, however, who probably feel a much lower pressure to help the
receiver and a lower level of responsibility for the well-being of the receiver initially, this text may be
able to increase the feelings of responsibility and, thus, the pressure to help. This could then lead to
the observed effect that men increase their giving after seeing the responsibility text.
With respect to the DecisionPower treatment, our prediction was less clear. If it reminds participants
of their accountability for their action by highlighting their control over the decision, it may have
increased giving compared to the Control treatment. On the contrary, if participants perceived the text
in this treatment as a justification for selfish behavior, it may even have reduced giving compared to
the Control treatment. Indeed, the insignificant overall effect we find may reflect that these behavioral
forces counteract each other. Future research should try to disentangle these mechanisms. The weakly
significant, positive effect for female dictators may be explained by the explicit reduction of social
pressure to which female participants seem to respond positively. Presumably, they appreciate the
reduction of the general pressure they usually face to behave altruistically. If future research should
indeed confirm that women are more willing to do somebody a favor or to comply with a request when
they are reminded of their freedom of choice than when they are told that they are responsible for the
potential beneficiary of a request, this could have important implications. Besides direct applications
such as everyday life situations of asking somebody a favor or charity organizations asking somebody
for money, these insights may also be applicable to leadership strategies in the workplace: it may be
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that female employees’ compliance with a request could be increased by formulating such a request in
a way as to highlight their freedom of choice and, thereby, presumably decrease the pressure to comply.
Our study contributes to the literature in several ways. The first contribution can be seen as a
series of robustness checks or extensions: it replicates the findings of Brañas-Garza [28] that reminding
the dictator that the other party depends on her has a significantly positive effect on dictators’ giving,
using a different version of the text for the frame.18 Furthermore, this paper provides additional
evidence of framing effects in dictator games [4,9]. In particular, we contribute evidence of how these
frames are sensitive to the dictator’s gender. More generally speaking, we thereby contribute to the
literature on gender differences in the field of social preferences [17].
As another, probably more important contribution, the present paper provides novel insights
into what has driven dictators’ reaction to pre-play messages sent by the recipient in Bruttel et al. [33].
They report that only female dictators react positively to messages emphasizing the dictator’s power
position. Their dataset did not allow differentiating between messages emphasizing freedom of choice
and those stressing the dictator’s responsibility so that they could only report a joint positive effect of
these types of messages. If our result regarding the weakly positive effect of highlighting the freedom
of choice for female dictators is confirmed by future research, it will suggest that the aspect of the
freedom of choice rather than the responsibility argument is responsible for this gender difference in
their study. The relative weakness of this effect in the present study furthermore indicates that text
messages sent by the recipient to the dictator have a stronger impact on giving decisions than a framing
text written by the experimenter. However, particularly this last finding needs further substantiation
by future research.
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Appendix A. Supplementary Tables and Figures
Table A1. Descriptive statistics of the distribution of participants across treatments.
Treatments
Control Responsibility DecisionPower
male 0.42 (a) 0.55 0.49
age 21.79 21.55 20.88
N 56 77 74
(a) One participant in the treatment Control did not provide information on their gender.
18 Brañas-Garza [28] does not present results depending on gender.
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Table A2. OLS regression results for a model including gender interaction effects.
Variables Give
Responsibility −0.004(0.041)
DecisionPower 0.066(0.041)
Responsibility × male 0.128 **(0.061)
DecisionPower × male −0.066(0.061)
male −0.050(0.047)
age −0.002(0.004)
Constant 0.419 ***(0.098)
Observations 205
R-squared 0.155
Note: The dependent variable in the regression is the share of the endowment given by the dictator.
The regression controls for participants’ field of study. ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
Appendix B. Instructions for Participants of the Experiment
The following section provides the English translation of the originally German instructions,
which participants playing the role of the dictator received in the experiment:
Verbal Instructions / Welcome Address
Hello, my name is Florian Stolley and I am a research assistant at the University of Potsdam.
Today, you are participating in an experiment in which you make a simple decision. Please think
carefully about this decision as it has real consequences.
By participating in this experiment, you support our research. Additionally, you can earn
money. Following the experiment, a ten-sided die will be thrown. If the last digit of your
participant ID—the so-called payoff-number—is thrown, you will receive a payment immediately
after the lecture. The amount of the payment depends on your decision in this experiment. You will
find more details about this in the instructions.
In front of you, you find a large envelope. This envelope contains:
1. the instructions.
2. a small envelope with the number 1 on it.
3. a small envelope with the number 2 on it.
Please start by reading the instructions carefully. Please open envelope 1 and make a decision
only after reading the instructions. Afterwards, please open envelope 2 and fill in a questionnaire.
We ask you to be quiet and to not talk to each other during the experiment.
You can start now by opening the large envelope and reading the instructions carefully.
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Welcome to this experiment! 
 
Thank you very much for participating in this experiment! 
Thereby, you support our research and can earn money in addition. 
 
 Please do not open the two small envelopes yet. 
 Please read the instructions carefully and follow the instructions. 
 Please stay quietly in your seat for the entire duration of the experiment and do not 
talk to other participants. 
 Please refrain from using your cell phone during the experiment. 
 Please do not look at other participants’ sheets and do not let other participants look at 
yours. 
 Please keep your place card until the end of the lecture. Only with this place card, you 
are able to receive a payment. 
 
Use of data: 
Following today’s experiment, the data will be analyzed anonymously. If you are chosen for 
payment by the throw of the die, you will have to acknowledge the amount received with your 
name and signature. These data are only used for the financial accounting of this experiment. 
Your name will not be linked to your decision or to your answers on the questionnaire. You 
can abort your participation in this experiment at any time; however, this would then result in 
you being ineligible for payment. 
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Instructions 
In the experiment, you will make a decision. After all participants in this room are finished 
with the experiment, it is going to be decided by chance (a public throw of a die) who of you 
receives a payment. The probability to receive a payment is 1 to 10 or 10%. 
The amount of money you receive, if you are chosen by the throw of the die, depends on your 
decision in the experiment. Thus, your decision has real consequences. You should think 
carefully about your decision. 
In the experiment, you and the other participants each assume a role. There are two different 
roles which will be called A and B from now on. You and the other participants in this room 
will all assume the role of “A.” The participants, who will assume the role of “B,” are in a 
parallel lecture, which takes place right now in another room on the Campus Griebnitzsee.  
Should you be chosen by the throw of the die, you will be matched randomly with a 
participant B. You will not learn the identity of this person, neither before nor after the 
experiment. The participant B you were matched too will not learn your identity as well. 
 
Decision: 
You, as “A”, receive an endowment of 30 Euros. The “B”s do not receive any endowment. 
You can decide on how much of your endowment you want to give to the participant B you 
are matched to. You can choose any integer amount between 0 and 30 Euros.  
 
Throw of the die: 
The last digit of your participant ID, which you can find, for example, on your place card or 
on your large envelope, is the payoff-number. The payoff-number is a number between 0 and 
9. Following the experiment, a ten-sided die will be thrown here in the lecture room. The 
number thrown decides who of you receives a payment. 
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Payment: 
After this lecture, the participants who have been chosen by the throw of the die for payment 
will receive their payment. The amount paid out depends on the individual decisions by the 
participants. 
Please keep your place card until the end of the lecture because only with the place card, 
you are able to receive a payment. 
 
Summary: 
 You are a participant A. The participants B are in another room in this building at this 
very moment. 
 You decide on how much of your endowment of 30 Euros you want to give to the 
participant B you are matched to (if your payoff-number should be chosen by the 
throw of the die). 
 You will receive your payment at the end of the lecture for handing in your place card 
(if your payoff-number should be chosen by the throw of the die). 
 
Single steps: 
1. Open the envelope with the number 1 and note your decision on the inlying 
decision sheet. 
2. Fold the decision sheet and put it back into the envelope number 1. 
3. Open the envelope with the number 2 and fill in the inlying questionnaire. 
4. Fold the questionnaire and put it back into the envelope number 2. 
5. Put envelope number 1, envelope number 2 and the instructions into the large 
envelope and seal it. 
6. Please wait quietly until all other participants are finished and all envelopes have been 
collected. 
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Appendix C. Pictures of the Material Used for the Experiment
Figure A1. Large envelope with a sticker with seat and id on it
Figure A2. Content of the envelope—instructions and two smaller envelops
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Figure A3. Content of small envelope marked with a 1-decision sheet
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